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Abstract
An unstable macroeconomic environment is often regarded as detrimental to economic
growth. Among the sources contributing to such instability, much of the blame has been
assigned to political issues. This paper empirically tests for a causal and negative long-run
relationship between political instability and economic growth but finds no such relationship.
Sensitivity analysis, however, indicates that there is indeed a short-run negative relationship
and, that in the long-run and ignoring institutional factors, the group of African countries is the
driving force. In other words, we suspect that excluding the African countries from their
samples, results of a negative relation between SPI and growth would founder.
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I. Introduction
An unstable macroeconomic environment is often regarded as detrimental to economic
growth. Among the many potential sources of such instability, much of the blame has been
assigned to political issues.
1 Socio-political instability (hereafter, SPI) fuels social unrest,
which disrupts productive activities and increases overall uncertainty. The negative effects of
SPI are then felt throughout the economy. Although these effects have been identified for
numerous macroeconomic variables,
2 the litmus test is whether or not SPI causes slower
economic growth. These causality issues acquire added importance in light of the profession’s
renewed interest in economic growth. Despite the fact that the negative relationship between
SPI and growth has been elevated to the status of a “stylized fact,”
3 the empirical studies upon
which this judgement is made are often criticized for the large numbers of explanatory
variables, selected in a seemingly ad hoc manner.
4 Although not fully sharing this criticism, we
are convinced that this finding should not be elevated to “stylized fact” status without
demonstrating that causality runs from SPI to growth, rather than vice-versa.
  The objective of this paper is to investigate the existence (and direction) of a causal
relationship between SPI and economic growth. To do so, we construct two different indexes
                                        
1 Another important source of such instability is policy variability, as formalized by Hopenhayn and
Muniagurria (1996). Brunetti (1998) provides empirical evidence.
2  For instance, among the variables allegedly affected by SPI are the independence of central banks
(see e.g. Cukierman, Webb and Neypati, 1992), seigniorage (Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini,
1992), aggregate investment (Ozler and Rodrik, 1992), budget deficits (Roubini, 1991), external debt
(Alesina and Tabellini, 1989, and Ozler and Tabellini, 1991), and exchange rate regime (Collins,
1996). Excellent examples of the literature on SPI and growth are Alesina, Ozler, Roubini and Swagel
(1996), and Ades and Chua (1997).
3 Distilling the lessons from this literature, Mankiw lists among its robust findings that “political
instability, as measured by the frequency of revolutions, coups, or wars, is negatively associated with
growth” (1995, 302, italics added). Another assessment of what has been learned from such studies is
the following “stylized fact” from Persson and Tabellini’s chapter for the  Handbook of
Macroeconomics: “Political instability, as measured by more frequent regime changes, or political
unrest and violence, is significantly and negatively correlated with growth in cross-country data”
(forthcoming, 78).
4 Durlauf and Quah (1998) provide the most extensive review of this empirical literature and find that
more than 80 different explanatory variables have been used thus far.2
of SPI for non-overlapping five-year periods, between 1960 and 1995, for 98 developing
countries. We use the Granger causality framework and report Anderson-Hsiao-Arellano
instrumental variable estimates.
5
We do not find evidence of the hypothesized negative and causal relationship between
political instability and economic growth. Our sensitivity analysis, however, suggests two
explanations for the apparent disagreement between our findings and those of the rest of the
literature. One is that, for the full sample, the negative relationship obtains only
contemporaneously (and independently of whether we use 25 or 5-year averages.) And the
second is that, in the long run and ignoring institutional factors, the Sub-Saharan Africa
sample seems to be the underlying driving force. In other words, we suspect that excluding the
African countries from their samples, the existing results of a negative relation between SPI
and growth would founder.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present our two measures of
SPI, describe how each index is constructed and map the relationship between them. In section
III we discuss the advantages and shortcomings of the Granger-causality framework. In
Section IV we present our causality results, reporting Anderson-Hsiao-Arellano instrumental
variable estimates. In Section V we subject these results to sensitivity analysis, investigating
the extent to which they are affected by a set of structural factors (namely, institutional
development and initial conditions). Section 6 concludes.
II. The Measurement of Political Instability
There seem to be two rather different understandings of SPI in the literature. One
stresses regular and irregular government transfers, while the other focuses on much harsher
                                        
5 We must note up front that reporting either OLS or Anderson-Hsiao estimates (which are available
from the authors upon request) would not change our conclusions. Our choice of reporting Anderson-
Hsiao-Arellano estimates is based on the need to address important econometric problems to which
most of the literature seems inattentive.3
aspects, such as revolutions, coups d'Etat, civil wars and political assassinations.
6 That these
overlap (e.g. both include irregular government transfers) does little to diminish the different
intensities each attach to “instability.” While the former interpretation constrains it to relatively
tame phenomena, the latter places it closer to social chaos. In an attempt to reflect these
nuances, we construct two measures of SPI, one capturing the more severe and the other the
less severe forms of SPI.
 While many other variants could have been used,
7 our justification is
that these bound the realistic range of such measures. That is, using both lower (less severe)
and upper bound (more severe) measures of SPI should allow us to provide a complete
depiction of the causality structure between SPI and growth.
For our measure of “severe” or “upper-bound” SPI, we follow most of the existing
literature
 in using three indicators: the numbers of political assassinations, revolutions and
successful coups d'Etat.
8 The first is measured as the yearly number of assassinations per
million people, while the others are counts of the number of those events in a given year.
For the measure of the “moderate” or “lower-bound” SPI we follow Chen and Feng
(1996) and others in the use of indicators from the Polity III data collection (Jaegger and
Gurr, 1996). A crucial advantage of using this source is its relatively complete country and
time coverages. From it, we select the following variables: competitiveness and regulation of
political participation; regulation, competitiveness, and openness of executive recruitment; and
the legal (de jure) and operational (de facto) independence of the chief executive.
9 Because
political actors and processes are to be subject to systematic regulation, this set of indicators
                                        
6 See footnote 3 above.
7 We are aware of the difficulties of measuring less severe or lower bound SPI and as noted below
admit to the need for experimenting with other possible indexes. Our point is simply that an alternative
to the traditional, severe or upper bound measure of SPI is needed.
8 The data source is Barro and Lee (1993).
9 Maybe a more appropriate lower-bound measure of SPI would include strikes, demonstrations without
violence or deaths, regional and internal conflicts, free press, etc. To our knowledge, data on such
variables are not available for our sample (98 developing countries, 1960-1995).4
should be capable of capturing the extent of even subtle changes in both legal and actual
practice. The less regulated are such actors and processes, the greater is the potential for
social and political change (and the higher the value of this SPI index.
 10)
 We collect time series data for the variables underlying the two SPI indexes and real
per capita GDP growth rates, covering the period 1960-1995 in an unbalanced panel of 98
developing countries (see Appendix.)
11 There are 14 countries from Asia, 20 from Latin
America, 16 from the Middle East and North Africa and 38 from Sub-Sahara Africa.
These two SPI indexes are constructed by the method of principal components (also
following most of the literature.) This method is superior because it addresses the latent
variable problem and minimizes the inherent arbitrariness in the aggregation procedure. For
the severe or upper bound SPI (UBSPI) indicator, the loadings resulting from this procedure
are 0.3162 for assassinations, 0.6909 for revolutions, and 0.6502 for coups. In the case of
lower bound SPI (LBSPI), the resulting loadings are 0.3923 and 0.1105 for the
competitiveness and regulation of political participation (respectively); 0.4677, 0.4734 and
0.3535 for regulation, competitiveness, and openness of executive recruitment; and 0.2317
and 0.4608 for the legal (de jure) and operational (de facto) independence of the chief
executive.
12
  Since both indexes are measures of SPI, one would expect them to be positively
correlated. Yet, since both capture rather different aspects of SPI, the correlation between
them should not be very high. In general, these expectations are fulfilled: with the exception of
                                        
10 Since in Polity III (Jaegger and Gurr, 1996), these indicators are assigned high scores when the extent
of regulations is higher (implying lower SPI), for present purposes the coding has been reversed.
11 Per capita GDP data are from Summers and Heston (1994). We chose an unbalanced panel in order
to deviate as little as possible from the rest of the literature. The differences between our sample and
those used in other studies are marginal (in terms of the number of countries and time period covered).
12 We should note that with this data set, we did find a significant negative contemporaneous
relationship between our five-year averages of severe SPI and the rate of economic growth for the full
sample as well as for each of the regions.  However, this negative relationship need not imply causality.5
the Middle East and North Africa region, for all other regions the correlation between the
respective pairs of SPI indexes is positive and statistically significant (shown in column (1) of
Table 1). Although correlation coefficients indicate the extent to which a linear relationship
exists, they cannot discern non-linearities that may characterize this relationship (between
UBSPI and LBSPI). To get at such non-linearities, in the remaining columns of Table 1 we
present some results from two alternative specifications. Column (2) contains the adjusted R
2
of regressions where the dependent variable is LBSPI and the independent variables are
UBSPI and squared UBSPI. For the sample as a whole and for each region, the coefficients of
both the linear and quadratic UBSPI terms are significant at the 1-percent level, and have
negative and positive signs respectively, suggesting that the relationship is indeed highly non-
linear. Because a comparison of columns (1) and (2) indicate that for some regions the simple
correlation is still superior, in the remaining columns of Table 1 we report the values of the
adjusted R
2 and subsequently the regression coefficients from regressions that, in addition to
UBSPI and its square, include the cube of UBSPI. Notice that now all adjusted R
2 are higher
than the simple correlations, the original sign pattern of the coefficients (minus for the linear
term and plus for the squared term) is maintained, and all of them are significant with the
exception of the linear term for Asia. On this basis, we claim that our lower-bound SPI index
is indeed systematically though non-linearly related to SPI of the more traditional “severe” or
upper-bound variety.
Table 1.





















































Notes: Column (1) contains the simple correlation coefficients between the two indexes of socio-
political instability (LBSPI and UBSPI). Numbers in brackets are p-values.
Column (2) shows the adjusted R
2 
of a regression where the dependent variable is LBSPI and the
independent variables are UBSPI and UBSPI
2
. In all regressions, both coefficients are significant
at the 1 percent level, and have negative and positive signs respectively.
Column (3) shows the adjusted R
2 
of a regression where the dependent variable is LBSPI and the
independent variables are UBSPI, UBSPI
2 and UBSPI
3.





regression which adjusted R
2 
 is shown in column (3). Numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics. A *
denotes that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 percent level, ** that it is
statistically significant at the 5 percent level, and *** that it is statistically significant at the 1
percent level.
III. The Costs and Benefits of Granger Causality
This section discusses the conceptual and econometric advantages (as well as the
limitations) of the Granger-causality framework. This framework has endured the test of time
because of its elegance and strong intuitive appeal: the notion that an event in the future
cannot cause one in the past.
13 Consider two time series, xt and yt. Series xt is said to Granger-
cause series yt if, in a regression of yt on lagged y’s and lagged x’s, the coefficients of the
lagged x’s are jointly significantly different from zero.
                                        
13 Granger generously remarks that “causation is a non-symmetric relationship, and there are various
ways in which asymmetry can be introduced, the most important of which are controllability, a relevant
theory, outside knowledge, and temporal priority” (1987, 49.) For discussion see, e.g., Hsiao (1979),
and Zellner (1989).7
There are two critical issues to be addressed when conducting Granger causality
tests.
14 The first concerns the length and frequency of the time lags. On their length, Granger
admonishes that “using data measured over intervals much wider than actual causal lags can
destroy causal interpretation” (Granger, 1987, p.49). We believe that five year periods are
short enough to allow us to investigate the effects of lagged variables, and yet long enough to
be meaningful for studying the long-run effects of SPI on economic growth, and vice-versa
(Solow, 1997). As for their frequency, there are a number of tests to determine the optimal
number of lags but because ours is a short panel we used a grid procedure to evaluate the
robustness of the results presented below.
The second issue to be dealt with lies in the information set. The test depends on the
assumption that the cause contains unique information about the effect, in the sense that it is
exhaustive and unavailable elsewhere. If the information set underlying the test is composed by
two series, both of which may be affected by a third variable, the test can be rendered useless.
In what follows, we present Granger-causality results that are enlarged by two variables that
can potentially play such a disruptive role (namely, an index of institutional development and
the initial level of income per capita).
Finally, we need to be attentive to the econometric issues that arise from the addition
of the lagged dependent variable, in the right-hand side. This is referred to in the econometric
literature as the dynamic panel data problem.
15 It has been established that the lagged
dependent variable is correlated with the error term by construction, rendering the OLS
estimator biased and inconsistent. To tackle this problem, in this paper we report a variant the
instrumental variable approach pioneered by Anderson and Hsiao (1982). This solution
                                        
14 We do not know of other studies that use the Granger framework in the instability-growth context.
However, examples of recent studies that use Granger-causality testes in different contexts are
Bahmani-Oskooee et al. (1991), Blomstrom et al. (1996), Conte and Darrat (1988), and Oxley (1994).
15 For discussion see, e.g., Hsiao (1986), Sevestre and Trognon (1992), and Baltagi (1995).8
requires first-differencing all variables and using the second lag differences as instruments.
16
We now turn to the results.
IV. Empirical Results
We begin our investigation of the causality patterns between SPI and economic growth
in Tables 2 and 3.
17 In Table 2 we ask whether (severe or moderate) SPI Granger-causes per
capita GDP growth. In our complete sample of 98 developing countries, we find no evidence
of a causal relationship: neither moderate nor severe SPI seems to Granger-cause economic
growth. When we break down these results by region, we find a negative relationship only
between moderate SPI and growth only for the Sub-Saharan Africa sample. It should also be
noted that the effect  (i.e., the sign of the relevant coefficient) varies substantially not only by
region, but also by the SPI index used. Note that, for the Middle East and North Africa region,
the commonly used severe SPI index Granger-causes economic growth. Yet for these




Does SPI Granger-cause per capita GDP Growth?
(Endogenous variable is D GDPt)







                                        
16 In fact the results presented below follow Arellano's recommendation (1989) to use as instruments,
not the lagged differences, but the lagged levels. Notice, however, that our results are not sensitive to
this choice of instruments. These are available from the authors upon request.
17 Throughout the paper, we use the term “x Granger causes y” as an abbreviation for “past x values
show a statistically significant effect on current values of y, given the past history of y”.
18 Campos, Nugent and Robinson (1998) find that in the Middle East and North Africa region, external
political instability affect economic performance directly and indirectly (via policy distortions),
conditional on the level of internal SPI. Controlling for external political instability renders the
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(-1.96515)
.053819
(Endogenous variable is D GDPt)





























Notes: All variables are in first-differences (D ), five-year averages, between 1960-1995, and t-
statistics are in parenthesis. Instrumental variables estimates shown (Anderson-Hsiao-Arellano).
LBSPI is lower-bound SPI, UBSPI is upper bound SPI, and GDP is the OLS per capita GDP
Growth Rate.
*   Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
With respect to the relationship flowing from economic growth to SPI, the results
presented in Table 3 fail to reveal any indication of causality.
Table 3.
Does per capita GDP Growth Granger-cause SPI?
(Endogenous variable is lower-bound D LBSPIt)
D LBSPIt-1 D GDPt-1 Adj. R
2



























(Endogenous variable is upper-bound D UBSPIt)





























Notes: All variables are in first-differences (D ), five-year averages, between 1960-1995, and t-
statistics are in parenthesis. Instrumental variables estimates shown (Anderson-Hsiao-Arellano).
LBSPI is lower-bound SPI, UBSPI is upper bound SPI, and GDP is the OLS per capita GDP
Growth Rate.
*   Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
Summarizing, the evidence supporting the hypothesis that SPI causes a decrease in the
growth rate of per capita income seems much weaker than generally believed. In addition,
such a negative and causal relation seems to be largely confined to the Sub-Saharan Africa
sample, the only sample for which the relevant coefficient is statistically significant. Finally, we
find no evidence whatsoever of causality flowing the other way (i.e., from per capita GDP
growth to SPI.) Before discussing these results fully, it is appropriate to subject them to
various sensitivity analyses, which is the objective of the next section.11
V. Sensitivity Analysis
The objective of this section is to evaluate whether our results are robust to
modifications in the two most critical issues in the use of the Granger framework, namely the
nature of the time lags (their length and frequency) and the content of the information set.
First, we perform tests on the frequency of the time lags. Having in mind that ours is a
short panel, we experimented with including two lags of the “causing variable x” (instead of
the one lag results presented throughout this paper), and with the exclusion of one lag of the
“caused variable y.” Since none of these changes affect our conclusions, and given our focus
on the relation between SPI and long-term growth, we keep the length of the lag fixed at five
years.
19
The issue regarding the content of the information set refers to whether there are
omitted variables that affect both growth and SPI. A particularly promising candidate for such
a role is institutional development. Our measure institutional development is the index of
“legislative effectiveness” from Banks (1984). It is selected here because it is available for a
large number of developing countries for a long period of time, and conceptually it captures an
aspect of institutional development that is closely related to SPI.
20 The unattractive features
are that the data are available only until 1984 (thereby forcing us to lose observations) and it is
a categorical variable that assumes one of four values, from zero to 3.
21 We mitigate these
                                        
19  It would be interesting to see under which lag length a causal relationship will appear (that is,
whether using one, two or three year lag lengths would change our conclusions; notice, however, that
these lengths would be too short for analyzing long-term economic growth). Gupta (1990) has annual
data for our severe SPI until 1982. He also mentioned (via personal communication) that the updating
of these series (until 1995) is not yet ready. We thus decided to leave this exercise for future work.
20 For example, the quality of the bureaucracy is another aspect of institutional development, but its
relation to SPI is not as direct or clear.
21  “Legislative effectiveness” (LEGEF) is coded zero if no legislature exists. It is coded ‘1’ for an
ineffective legislature, if legislative activity is of a “rubber stamp” character, or the implementation of
legislation is faulty or if it is completely subordinate to the executive. LEGEF is coded ‘2’ for a
“partially effective legislature”: if the executive’s power substantially outweighs, but does not12
drawbacks by lagging it one period and using 5-year averages. Our working hypothesis is that,
in a given country, the level of SPI is contemporaneously negatively correlated with the level
of institutional development.
22
The initial level of per capita income is another natural candidate for having an
influence on both SPI and economic growth. The convergence property of the neoclassical
growth model suggests that growth should be negatively related to the initial level of income
per capita. We conjecture also that lower levels of per capita income may increase the
potential for political instability.
Table 4.
Controlling for institutions and initial income, does SPI Granger-cause per capita GDP growth?
(Endogenous variable is D GDPt)

















































                                                                                                                              
completely dominate, that of the legislature. Finally, a code of ‘3’ is reserved for an “effective
legislature”, distinguished by significant governmental autonomy, including its ability to override
executive vetoes of legislation.
22  We find indeed support for the hypothesis that high levels of SPI are associated with low levels of
institutional development. The contemporaneous correlation between “legislative effectiveness” and
each of our SPI indexes are negative and statistically significant, at the 5 percent level, for our whole
sample and each of the four regions individually.13
(Endogenous variable is D GDPt)

















































Notes: All variables are in first-differences (D ), five-year averages, between 1960-1995, and t-
statistics are in parenthesis. Instrumental variables estimates shown (Anderson-Hsiao-Arellano). LBSPI
is lower-bound SPI, UBSPI is upper-bound SPI, GDP is the OLS per capita GDP Growth Rate,
LEGEF is an index of legislative effectiveness (institutional development), and GDP0 is level of initial
per capita income.
*   Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
In what follows, we present results obtained by adding these two dimensions (initial
income and levels of institutional development) to the specifications for the Granger-causality
tests reported in the previous section. In Table 4 we investigate whether or not SPI Granger-
causes GDP growth, once we control for the levels of institutional development and initial
income. There are two important changes compared to Table 2: first, a rise in lower bound
SPI ceases to Granger-cause (a decrease in) economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa and,
second, a rise in severe SPI ceases to Granger-cause (an increase in) GDP growth in the
Middle East and North Africa. It is worth noting that it is the inclusion of the institutional
variable that makes the coefficient for Sub-Saharan Africa statistically insignificant but it is the
inclusion of initial income per capita that does so for the Middle East and North Africa’s. In
other words, the result for Sub-Saharan Africa from Table 2 holds with initial income in the
specification (provided the institutional development variable is not included) and the result for14
the MENA region holds with the institutional development in the specification (provided initial
income is not included).
In Table 5 we ask whether economic growth Granger-causes SPI, once we control for
the levels of institutional development and initial income. Recall that from Table 3 we did not
obtain any indication of causality flowing in this direction, irrespective of the SPI index used
or of the regional breakdown. All the results hold, with one exception. The coefficient on
economic growth for Latin America turns out to be statistically significant after we enlarge the
information set. Moreover, the result indicates that a rise in the rate of per capita economic
growth in this region seems to Granger-cause a rise in the level of our moderate index of
socio-political instability. Further investigation revealed that it is the inclusion of the
institutional development variable that is responsible for this change.
23 The identification of the
precise mechanism for this destabilizing effect of economic growth in Latin America is left for
future work.
Table 5.
Controlling for institutions and initial income, does GDP per capita growth Granger-cause SPI?
(Endogenous variable is D LBSPIt)








































Sub-Saharan Africa .490306*** -.029438 -1.07150*** -.000153 .255005
                                        
23 Notice that including only initial income in the relevant specification from Table 3 also makes the
coefficient on economic growth become statistically significant, although only marginally at the 10
percent level. It is on this basis that we claim that the institutional variable is responsible for the
change.15
(2.73276) (-1.38838) (-6.23833) (-.601373)
(Endogenous variable is D UBSPIt)

















































Notes: All variables are in first-differences (D ), five-year averages, between 1960-1995, and t-
statistics are in parenthesis. Instrumental variables estimates shown (Anderson-Hsiao-Arellano). LBSPI
is lower-bound SPI, UBSPI is upper-bound SPI, GDP is the OLS per capita GDP Growth Rate,
LEGEF is an index of legislative effectiveness (institutional development), and GDP0 is level of initial
per capita income.
*   Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
VI. Conclusions
The objective of this paper was to investigate the existence (and direction) of a causal
relationship between SPI and economic growth. We find that the evidence supporting the
hypothesis that high levels of SPI cause lower rates of economic growth is much weaker than
generally believed, as we find no traces of a long-run causal relationship. How can this be
reconciled with the results from other studies? Our sensitivity analysis points towards a major
role played by the Sub-Sahara Africa sample. Not only the Sub-Saharan African sample is
much larger than those for other regions, but also SPI in Africa seems to be of a more
structural nature. Our finding that, once one controls for institutional development, the
causality results vanish supports this latter explanation. On this basis, this paper raises the
suspicion that excluding the African countries from their samples, the existing results of a
negative relation between SPI and growth would founder.16
Given the prominence the issue of political instability plays in recent macroeconomic
research in general (and in political economics in particular), there are a number of suggestions
for further research that should be put forward. First, in light of the inconsistency between
existing results (of a negative contemporaneous relation between SPI and economic growth)
and our own findings (of the lack of a causal negative relationship between SPI and growth),
one should ask at what frequencies and lag lengths does the relationship change from non-
causal to causal? As noted before, this is an important question we leave for future work. As
soon as high frequency data are available, attention should focus on this question.
  Second, there should be considerable scope to identify additional omitted variables,
especially those of an institutional nature, which might be related to both SPI and growth.
Numerous institutional variables may be relevant, like the fairness and effectiveness of the
judicial system and the stability of property rights. Indeed, in a cross-sectional framework
Keefer and Knack (1995) find that, once these are taken into account, the negative effect of
SPI on growth vanishes. Another important candidate for such an omitted variable role,
following Persson and Tabellini (1992, 1994) and Alesina and Perotti (1996), might be the
level of income inequality. Notice, however, that the data (on income distribution and
institutions) needed for these “enlargements” of our Granger tests are presently not available.
Third, given the difficulties in constructing a lower-bound measure of socio-political
instability, exploratory research of this sort with other SPI measures should be encouraged.
   Still another useful direction for future research would be to experiment with different
causality frameworks which can accommodate different lag structures as well as richer
information sets (Hsiao, 1979; Geweke et al., 1983). In addition, future work should also be
attentive to the myriad of econometric issues involved in dealing with unbalanced dynamic
short panels (Baltagi, 1995).17
Finally, in the light of the wide variety of other consequences that have been alleged to
SPI, and to which we referred to in our introduction, serious consideration should also be
given to the examination of causal relationships between SPI and these other variables. In
particular, it would be interesting to see whether the Sub-Saharan Africa sample would again
play such a determinant role.
Appendix:
Sample of 98 developing countries
(Number of countries in parenthesis)
Asia (14): Bangladesh, China, Indonesia, India, South Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar,
Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and Thailand.
Latin America (20): Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Peru, Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
Middle-East and North Africa (16): Algeria, Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan,
Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and
Yemen.
Sub-Saharan Africa (38): Angola, Burundi, Benin, Burkina Faso, Botswana, Cameroon,
Central Africa Republic, Chad, Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Ivory
Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius,
Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sudan, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa,
Togo, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
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